As a general rule I want to preserve this blog for talk about physics but several of the well read physics blogs are talking about the banking crisis and the collapse of Lehman Brothers so I will make one comment here. I am not going to say anything about whether governments should be bailing out banks. I am looking at the longer term issue of why this kind of thing happens.
Let’s get one thing out of the way. The situation is nothing to do with how quants model prices and invent new types of security. There are many types of risk when you take on a financial contract and models such as Black Sholes only take a few short term risks into account. It is well known from experience that hedge funds will collapse due to liquidity risks of you take the models too seriously. The only way to prevent it is through the application of common sense and experience.
Lehman Brothers narrowly escaped from going under in 1998 when it was hit by a combination of an Asian financial crisis, the collapse of junk bonds in emerging markets and exposure to the failed LTCM hedge fund. Why did they not learn from this? This time round they were hit by a crisis in the US mortgage market. Lehman Brothers were very big on mortgages and had huge assets in risky sub-prime loans. Low interest rates had allowed the banks to inflate the housing bubble without it bursting for too long, but it was inevitable that it would burst soon. Why could they not see such an obvious risk?
The answer of course was that they could see the risk. They may not have expected the end ot be quite so dramatic but they knew the market as well as anybody. Predicting exactly when a financial bubble will burst is like trying to predict when a good spell of Autumn whether will end. There is no formula for it. But it is easy to see that it must end at some point and it may end with a dramatic storm.
To understand why they did nothing you must look at the structure of an investment banks workforce. Most people in an investment bank are paid well but there is a small minority who are paid extremely well. They are the MDs and above. They constitute perhaps 1% of the total workforce yet they get the majority of the pay and most of that comes in the form of an annual bonus. They are paid on the basis of how much money they and their staff can make the bank each year. Many MDs count their bonuses in millions of dollars. By time they get to such a high position they have probably already earned enough to be able to retire in comfort for the rest of their lives. Few of them work in a bank because they like the lifestyle. They are there to earn as much as they can as quickly as they can before they move on. In such a system it makes sense on a personal level to take high risks in the hope of making a lot of money in a few years. When they do well they get a big bonus but when they fail and the bank looses money they do not have to pay it back. Usually they will calmly announce their departure well before the end of the year knowing that big bonuses are not due. They may move on to another bank where they will be welcomed with a huge golden hello to compensate them for their loss of tied shares, or they may just retire to their ranch in the South.
Given such a system of remuneration it is a wonder that banks do not go under more often, but there are forces that keep the risks down. In the short term risks are controlled with suitable hedging. Many financial instruments devised by quants are designed for this purpose. If you have exposure to a company that would mean a loss if it went bust then you can buy a credit default swap that pays out like insurance when that happens. Another factor that keeps risks down is regulation. Government operated regulators stipulate that banks must keep sufficient capital in liquid low risk forms such as cash so that they are financially sound, but these regulations have to be spelt out as rules and formulae. They cannot be left to common sense, yet as I already said, an element of common sense and experience is required to judge the largest risks.
There is one more factor that helps keep risk down. It’s the banks ratings. rating agencies such as Moody’s, S&P and Fitch provide credit ratings for companies, governments and other agencies that issue bonds. Governments have the highest AAA ratings when they sell debt in their own currency because they can always print more money to pay the coupons. Large banks are often the next highest. The rating agencies gauge the rating of the bank based on their performance and on the type of assets they hold. If they see that they are taking too high a risk they should lower the rating. These ratings are very important to the bank because their cost of borrowing is directly linked to them. Just like an individual person it is easier and cheaper for a bank to borrow money if they have a good credit rating. Banks need to borrow money to invest in assets and ventures that return a higher yield. The ability of an investment bank to make money is directly related to its credit rating. Nothing is more important to the bank. The ratings are intended to measure the long term security of the company because they often support bonds issued for 30 years or more, so it is these ratings that force the banks to care about their long term risks.
So the rating agencies have a controlling hand in Wall Street, yet they are not government controlled. They are public profit making companies. Somehow they failed to see the huge risk that the banks had taken with mortgage backed securities. When the dust settles and people start to seriously investigate what went wrong, the big question will be, Why did the ratings not reflect the risks the banks faced?
Today Wall Street has undergone a dramatic change. Lehman Brothers are gone, Merril Lynch has been acquired by BOA. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley have given up their investment bank status. There is not much left of the system that ruled a few months ago. But in time they will return. The US treasury will release the grip it has been forced to take and the money making machine will move back into the hands of the MDs. Investment banks are needed to finance the economy and politicians are notthe right kind of people to run them. Human nature cannot be changed so history will be in danger of repeating itself, but the world needs a stable economy. It does not need a cyclic economy that falls flat on its face every 10 years.
Solutions: Governments buying back bad debt is a short term solution and not one they will want to repeat. The bonus system for renumeration in banks is partly to blame for the problem but it is driven by market forces so it is hard to eliminate. Monitoring individual bonus awards is not practical in the long term although a few measures such as outlawing golden hellos which compensate loss of CSA would help.
The only practical long term solution is for governments to set up their own impartial rating agencies for banks and other large institutions who issue debt or act as counterparties in financial transactions. These agencies would have to be harsh by reducing ratings when a bank takes on too much risk, especially liquidity risks. To make the process less painful they could use a more fine grained rating that can be raised and lowered in smaller increments. They could even include the effect of the companies bonus policy in the equation. Traders would be quick to factor the ratings into their pricing just as they do now with the ratings from Moodys and S&P to take account of counterparty risk. The effect would be more immediate and dramatic than any artificial process of sanction or taxation.
